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We often learn by watching other people.
Consider for example how children learn
to lace their shoes. An adult will, granted
enough patience, repeatedly demonstrate
how to handle the shoe laces to get to the
wanted end result. Although the demon-
stration will be accompanied by speech
(“now bring this lace to the other side”),
the observation of the sequence of motor
acts is instructive for children to learn
how to do it themselves. In adulthood
such observational learning is also preva-
lent. Just think of someone showing you
how to serve a tennis ball, how to dance,
or how to open a bottle of wine. What
these situations have in common is that
the learner tries to learn a skill by observ-
ing how someone else performs this skill.
Put differently, the learner tries to inter-
nalize the act that she observes so that she
will be able to do it herself. In their recent
study in The Journal of Neuroscience, Frey
and Gerry (2006) investigated the brain
mechanism underlying observational
learning using functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging. They were particularly in-
terested in the role of the “action recogni-
tion system” in learning a sequence of acts
by observation. In other words, would the
observer’s action recognition system be
activated differently if an observed se-
quence had to be acted out later or not?
Moreover, the authors looked into how
focusing on the sequence of observed
events affected parts of the neural network
involved in observational learning.
Healthy participants watched a video
clip of a person constructing a Tinkertoy
[Frey and Gerry (2006), their Fig. 1
(http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/
full/26/51/13194/F1)]. In the LEARN
condition, participants were instructed to
carefully watch the video and were asked
to assemble the toy themselves after the
experiment in exactly the same sequence
of events as in the video. In the CON-
TROL condition, a video of someone dis-
assembling a toy was shown. Here the in-
struction simply was to watch the video,
without the need to remember the se-
quence of actions. The rationale of this
manipulation is that observational learn-
ing was induced in the LEARN condition
but not in the CONTROL condition,
whereas perceptual input was kept con-
stant. Both conditions compared with a
passive baseline (watching a fixation
cross) activated the “action recognition
network” (including parietal, inferior
frontal, and premotor areas but also cere-
bellum and part of the basal ganglia) [Frey
and Gerry (2006), their Fig. 2 (http://
www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/26/
51/13194/F2)]. Interestingly, in the
LEARN condition, parts of this network
were more strongly activated than in the
CONTROL condition [Frey and Gerry
(2006), their Fig. 3 (http://www.jneurosci.
org/cgi/content/full/26/51/13194/F3)]. In
other words, this action recognition sys-
tem was more strongly activated when
participants observed an action with the
intention to reproduce it later, compared
with when they observed the action with-
out the intention to reproduce it. What is
interesting is that also parts of the motor
system traditionally regarded as “lower”
in the cortical hierarchy such as the dorsal
part of premotor cortex or pre-supple-
mentary motor area (SMA) showed this
increase in activation (see also Grezes et
al., 1999). Interestingly, activation in right
intraparietal cortex showed a strong cor-
relation with participants’ actual perfor-
mance on reconstructing the Tinkertoy af-
ter watching the video [Frey and Gerry
(2006), their Fig. 4 (http://www.jneurosci.
org/cgi/content/full/26/51/13194/F4)].
This latter finding is especially relevant
in the context of the second experiment in
which the authors specifically looked into
the role of sequencing. The same stimuli
were used in a different group of partici-
pants. Now the task was to either simply
watch the videos (CONTROL condition
as before) or to watch the videos with the
intention to be able to reconstruct the
Tinkertoy afterward. The crucial differ-
ence with experiment 1 was that no men-
tion was made as to how the toy had to be
reconstructed, i.e., about the exact se-
quence of acts. All that was asked of par-
ticipants was to recreate the toy. Indeed,
behavioral scores indicate that although
participants were as good at reconstruct-
ing the toy as in experiment 1, they less
often used exactly the same sequence of
acts as those demonstrated in the video.
Similar to the previous experiment, a net-
work of areas in parietofrontal areas (in-
cluding premotor cortex), the cerebellum
and basal ganglia, showed increased acti-
vation to the LEARN condition compared
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with the CONTROL condition [Frey and
Gerry (2006), their Fig. 5 (http://www.
jneurosci.org/cgi/content/full/26/51/
13194/F5)]. The relationship between off-
line performance and activity in right
intraparietal cortex as reported in experi-
ment 1 was, however, not observed. The
authors conclude that this parietal region
plays a crucial role in the encoding of a
sequence. This is an interesting finding
given studies that propose a role for in-
traparietal cortex in coding the goal of an
action (Hamilton and Grafton, 2006).
More research is needed, however, to un-
derstand how these findings can be
related.
That Frey and Gerry found dorsal pre-
motor cortex and especially pre-SMA to
be more strongly activated in the “inten-
tional” LEARN condition than in the pas-
sive observation condition is in line with a
study showing pre-SMA activation specif-
ically correlated to the moment in time at
which participants felt the intention to
move their finger (Lau et al., 2004). It
seems that this premotor structure is in-
volved in the coding of the intention to act
[but see Iacoboni et al. (2005) for a differ-
ent interpretation in a study on the under-
standing of intentions]. How generally
true this is, as well as whether it translates
to other domains of cognition, is an im-
portant question for the future.
One methodological concern with the
present study is that changing task in-
structions could lead to confounds. It is
possible for instance that subjects in the
LEARN condition paid much closer at-
tention to the actions than in the
CONTROL condition. Along this line, the
activation increases might be the result of
a more general attentional effect than ob-
servational learning. Put differently, the
conditions may not have been that per-
ceptually similar after all, if one takes per-
ceptual similarity to also include the “ex-
actness” with which participants observe
the stimulus. Although the fact that pre-
motor areas were activated may argue
against such an explanation, it is hard to
exclude a top-down effect of attention on
premotor areas. It could be argued that
possible attentional factors were lower in
experiment 2. After all, participants “just”
had to pay attention to the end-state of the
toy, not to every action individually. Un-
fortunately, activations in the “action rec-
ognition areas” closely follow the pattern
expected from an attentional explanation:
high in experiment 1, lower in experiment
2 [Frey and Gerry (2006), their Fig. 6
(http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/content/
full/26/51/13194/F6)]. The similar accu-
racy scores in the two experiments (89 vs
83%) can furthermore be interpreted as
evidence for equal nonspecific task de-
mands, albeit indirect evidence. However,
it seems only fair to say that different de-
grees of attention are perhaps inherent to
observational learning versus more pas-
sive observation.
In conclusion, Frey and Gerry nicely
show the involvement of the action recog-
nition system (specifically premotor ar-
eas) in coding the intention to learn a se-
quence of acts. Moreover, their findings
extend knowledge about intraparietal cor-
tex in action observation by showing its
sensitivity to the sequence of observed
motor acts. One part that deserves more
attention in future research is the strong
social nature of observational learning. In
real life, the social relationship we have
with an instructor seems important in the
success of observational learning. That is,
you probably havemore faith in your par-
ents teaching you how to handle your
shoelaces than in your younger sister who
hardly knows how to do it herself.
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